If it's encrypted its secure! the viability of US state-based encryption exemptions by Burdon, Mark et al.
 
 
 
This is the author version published as: 
 
 
This is the accepted version of this article. To be published as : 
This is the author version published as: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Catalogue from Homo Faber 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
 
Burdon, Mark and Low, Rouhshi and Reid, Jason F. (2010) If it's encrypted it's 
secure! The viability of US state-based encryption exemptions. In: 
Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE International Symposium on technology and 
society : Social Implications of Emerging Technologies, 7-9 June 2010, 
University of Wollongong, New South Wales. 
           
Copyright 2010 IEEE/theAuthors 
If it's Encrypted its Secure! The Viability of US State-Based Encryption Exemptions  
 
 
Mark Burdon, Rouhshi Low and Jason Reid 
Queensland University of Technology 
{m.burdon, r.low}@qut.edu.au; reid@isi.qut.edu.au 
 
 
Abstract 
 
US state-based data breach notification laws have 
unveiled serious corporate and government failures 
regarding the security of personal information. These 
laws require organisations to notify persons who may be 
affected by an unauthorized acquisition of their personal 
information. Safe harbours to notification exist if 
personal information is encrypted. Three types of safe 
harbour have been identified in the literature: 
exemptions, rebuttable presumptions and factors. The 
underlying assumption of exemptions is that encrypted 
personal information is secure and therefore 
unauthorized access does not pose a risk. However, the 
viability of this assumption is questionable when 
examined against data breaches involving encrypted 
information and the demanding practical requirements of 
effective encryption management. Recent 
recommendations by the Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC) would amend the Privacy Act 1988 
(Cth) to implement a data breach scheme that includes a 
different type of safe harbour, factor based analysis. The 
authors examine the potential capability of the ALRC’s 
proposed encryption safe harbour in relation to the US 
experience at the state legislature level.   
1. Introduction 
At face value, the concept of data breach notification 
laws is simple. An organisation that has suffered a data 
breach, such as a ‘hacking’ incident, which potentially 
exposes personal information, must notify those persons 
whose information may have been acquired. 
Organizational notification fulfils two purposes. First, to 
provide consumers with an opportunity to protect 
themselves against identity theft [1, p. 1605; 2, p. 15; 3] 
and second to provide a regulatory tool that highlights 
poor organisational information security practices [4, p. 
947].  
US state-based data breach notification laws have 
unearthed numerous instances of ineffective management 
regarding the security of personal information. Since 
2005, an estimated 346 million records containing 
personal or sensitive personal information have been 
disclosed in the US without proper authorisation [5]. 
Whilst state-based data breach notification laws have 
been successful at highlighting the levels of 
organisational incompetence, they have produced 
outcomes that are conceptually complex from a number of 
different perspectives [4, 6-8].  
Even though data breach notification laws have been 
implemented by most US states [9], the application of the 
laws is not uniform because different laws adopt different 
statutory language [10, p. 136]. Moreover, inherent 
tensions exist within the concept of data breach 
notification regarding the balance sought between an 
individual’s ‘right to know’ about unauthorised uses of 
their personal information and corporate compliance 
reduction [4, p. 947]. These inherent tensions are readily 
identifiable in US state-based data breach encryption 
exemptions through the extraordinary number of 
encryption definitions that are in operation.  
Despite the apparent inconsistencies of the US state-
based laws, the Australian Law Reform Commission’s 
(ALRC) recent review of privacy [11] has recommended 
the implementation of a data breach notification scheme 
via the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (hereafter the “Privacy 
Act”). The authors examine the underlying assumption of 
US state-based encryption exemptions, namely that 
encrypted information is secure, by reference to current 
practice in the US and then compare the ALRC’s 
encryption safe harbour against the existing use of 
exemptions in US state laws. 
  
2. Methodology 
We adopted Jones’s classification of encryption safe 
harbours [12] to examine both US state-based laws and 
the ARLC’s proposal. Jones identified three types of 
encryption safe harbour in a brief review of 2007 US 
federal developments. Exemptions exempt notification if 
acquired personal information is encrypted because it is 
deemed not to pose a risk. Rebuttable presumptions create 
a presumption that encrypted data is secure and does not 
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have to be notified. However, this presumption can be 
rebutted by facts to the contrary. Factor-based analysis
requires breached organisations to demonstrate that the 
encryption adopted was effective before notification is 
exempted. We used Jones’s classification scheme to 
examine 46 US state-based data breach notification laws 
regarding the type of safe harbour adopted and the type of 
statutory constructions employed. We then compared the 
operation of different state-based safe harbours against (1) 
each other (2) examples of actual data breaches involving 
encryption and (3) the ALRC’s proposed safe harbour. 
Our justification for choosing US state-based laws was 
that they are the most established and there are cultural, 
legal, economic and social similarities between the US 
and Australia.   
 For the purpose of this paper, encryption is defined as 
the process of transforming an original piece of 
information into a form that is unreadable by 
unauthorized individuals [13]. A cryptographic algorithm
is used in combination with a key to encrypt the 
information and thereby transform it into an unintelligible 
output called ciphertext. Knowledge of the corresponding 
decryption key is required to reverse the process and 
transform the ciphertext back into its intelligible form, 
known as plaintext. The key is typically a long random 
number [13]. Encryption replaces the problem of 
protecting the confidentiality of a potentially large 
amount of plaintext for the problem of protecting the 
confidentially of a much smaller key. The effective use of 
encryption  requires the implementation of adequate 
security measures to protect encryption keys because if an 
encryption key is accessed without authorisation, the 
encrypted information can be decrypted into its original 
readable form [2, p. 12]. Figure 1 below incorporates 
these different features and details the operation of 
encryption in conjunction with data breach notification 
safe harbours to demonstrate how encryption operates and 
to outline the differences between exemptions and factor-
based analysis. 
Figure 1 – The use of encryption in exemptions and factor-based 
analysis 
 The diagram shows two types of common encryption 
use by organizations that involve protecting personal 
information in storage or in transmission. In turn, these 
two uses represent the most common forms of data breach 
[14]: a loss of a laptop or other storage media outside of 
organizational boundaries and a hacking incident that 
penetrates internal organizational security. Adequate 
encryption for both types of use requires the instigation of 
other information security management controls such as 
the encryption and separate storage of decryption keys 
and strong authentication of authorised users. Finally, 
whether a breach will be exempt from notification is 
potentially dependent on the type of safe harbour adopted. 
The key differences between exemptions and factor-based 
analysis are shown. We expand on these differences in the 
remaining sections of this paper.  
3. Encryption Exemptions in US State-based 
Data Breach Notification Laws 
We identified that 44 state-based laws have an 
encryption exemption and only two have no encryption 
based safe harbor [15-16]. The purpose of the exemption 
is to provide a threshold to organizational notification and 
thereby minimize compliance requirements for data 
breaches that are deemed unlikely to give rise to 
subsequent identity theft concerns. Accordingly, if 
personal information is lost, stolen or misplaced, but that 
information is encrypted, then it is deemed unlikely that 
nefarious uses can be made of the information. 
Furthermore, US state-based lawmakers have also used 
the encryption exemption as an encouragement for 
organizations to improve their information security 
through the adoption of encryption technologies [1, p. 
1628].       
However, one of the key criticisms of the US state-
based data breach laws is the panoply of statutory 
constructions in operation [9: 373] which has inhibited the 
development of uniform compliance for nationwide 
corporations [1, p. 1632] particularly as different 
legislative definitions can produce different material 
effects [7, pp. 707-710].  The extraordinary number of 
differently defined encryption exemptions is a clear 
example of these criticisms.  
The Californian law [17] was the first and most 
influential state-based data breach notification law and it 
has an encryption exemption that does not define 
encryption. Instead, the law simply states that notification 
is required if a Californian organization has suffered or 
believes it has suffered an unauthorised acquisition of 
unencrypted and computerised personal information. 
A majority of states have adopted the Californian 
model but some states have nonetheless added to the 
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original definition. For instance, Colorado’s law [18] has 
adopted the Californian triggering mechanism for 
notification but has amended its definition of personal 
information to include data elements that are ‘not 
encrypted, redacted, or secured by any other method 
rendering the name or the element unreadable or 
unusable’. The Colorado law broadens the scope of 
‘unencrypted’ information by including redaction (i.e. the 
truncation or alteration of letters or numbers to make data 
unreadable) and by the inclusion of other methods beyond 
encryption and redaction that would inhibit access to 
acquired information. Other Californian based exemptions 
are listed below. 
• Alaska – Data is not encrypted or redacted, or is 
encrypted and the encryption key has been accessed or 
acquired [19]. 
• Connecticut – Data has not been secured by 
encryption or by any other method or technology that 
renders the personal information unreadable or 
unusable [20]; 
• Minnesota – Data is not secured by encryption or 
another method of technology that makes electronic 
data unreadable or unusable, or was secured and the 
encryption key, password, or other means necessary 
for reading or using the data was also acquired [21]; 
• South Carolina – Data is not rendered unusable 
through encryption, redaction, or other methods [22]; 
and
• Utah – Data is unencrypted or not protected by 
another method that renders the data unreadable or 
unusable [23]. 
Unlike the above state laws, other states have 
attempted to define encryption in their statutes. However, 
once again, there is a multitude of different definitions in 
operation. For example, the North Carolinian law  defines 
encryption as ‘the use of an algorithmic process to 
transform data into a form in which the data is rendered 
unreadable or unusable without use of a confidential 
process or key’ [24]. Likewise, the Iowan law defines 
encryption in the same way but the definition of personal 
information states that for data to be personal data it must 
be ‘not encrypted, or otherwise altered by any method or 
technology in a manner that the name or data elements are 
unreadable’ [25]. Similarly, the Oregon legislation also 
defines encryption in the same way but provides a 
different definition of personal information to Iowa, 
namely, ‘data elements are not rendered unusable through 
encryption, redaction or other methods, or when the data 
elements are encrypted and the encryption key has also 
been acquired’ [26].  
Yet still other states define encryption differently to 
the North Carolinian example. The Ohioan law states that 
encryption is an algorithmic process to transform data 
except that it is in a ‘form in which there is a low 
probability of assigning meaning without use of a 
confidential process or key’ [27]. The Indiana law [28] 
has exactly the same clause but also adds a further clause 
to state that encrypted data can be ‘secured by another 
method that renders the data unreadable or unusable’. The 
New Hampshire legislation [29] also adds a further clause 
which states that data is not encrypted when it is acquired 
with the key or password that would enable access to it. 
As such, there are two elements in operation that set 
the standard for indicating when data will be encrypted, 
namely when, (1) data is rendered unreadable or unusable 
or (2) there is a low probability of assigning meaning to 
the data. Finally, there are a small number of states that 
have very different definitions of encryption from those 
highlighted above. The Massachusetts law [30] adopts the 
low probability requirement but stipulates the use of a 
‘128-bit or higher algorithmic process’ before data can be 
classified as encrypted. The Maine law [31] defines 
encryption as ‘the disguising of data using generally 
accepted practices’.  
4. The Assumption of US State-based 
Encryption Exemptions 
Skinner asserts that the underlying assumption of the 
encryption exemption in the Californian data breach
notification law is that if personal information is 
encrypted it is therefore deemed to be secure [2]. We 
agree with Skinner’s assertion and we contend that it 
applies to all state-based exemptions and especially those 
based on the Californian law. We further contend that the 
soundness of the assumption looks less certain when 
examined against the challenging practical and theoretical 
requirements of effective encryption management.  
4.1 US Data Breaches Involving Encryption  
Before we start this section, it is important to note that 
there is a dearth of publicly reported Australian data 
breaches so our research has concentrated reported US 
data breaches that involved encrypted personal 
information. These examples highlight that the underlying 
assumption of state-based laws is not as straightforward 
as it may first appear. In 2006 Linden Labs, the creators 
of the online virtual reality environment, Second Life 
suffered a data breach when an unauthorised third party 
gained access to servers storing customer information 
[32]. Linden Labs did not provide specific notification 
about the breach but they did inform users through one of 
their blogs that the probable purpose of the breach was to 
access source code and Linden dollars [33]. Other reports 
suggested that the extent of the breach was much greater 
and potentially all Second Life residents could be affected 
as their personal information may have been accessed 
[34]. Linden Labs confirmed that credit card numbers 
were not accessed because they were housed in a secure 
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back-end vault that had tightly limited access. However, 
in a reply to customer concerns about the breach, Linden 
Labs did state that it was possible that a small number of 
hashed credit card numbers were taken, along with other 
data and it was unlikely that credit card details could be 
decrypted and re-used [33].  
The Second Life data breach is of interest because it 
highlights weaknesses regarding non-comprehensive 
encryption of personal information. In this instance, only 
a small amount of personal information, namely credit 
card details, was encrypted whilst other personal 
information such as name and residential address was not. 
The fact that all personal information was not encrypted 
unnecessarily increased the risk of harm arising from the 
data breach. Moreover, Linden Labs did not declare the 
type of encryption adopted and so it is not clear whether a 
reliable and secure form of encryption was used to protect 
the credit card information. The reference to ‘hashed 
credit card numbers’ [33] supports this concern since hash 
functions do not provide the same level of protection as 
encryption. 
Another set of concerns involving encryption and data 
breaches are those in which unauthorised access may have 
impacted upon the security of encryption keys. The 
Dataloss database [35] provides details of several data 
breaches, where personal data was encrypted but the 
breached organisation nevertheless notified relevant 
government agencies and individuals, because they feared 
the encryption may not have provided effective 
protection. For example, the media technology 
corporation Voxant notified the North Carolina state 
government that customer personal information held on 
their e-commerce system was accessed as a result of a 
phishing attack in which an unauthorised party gained 
access to usernames and passwords. This allowed them to 
log onto the system as though they were an authorised 
user, thus bypassing encryption protections. Though 
credit card details were encrypted, Voxant decided to 
notify individuals because of the risk arising from the 
breach which meant the encryption was ineffective [36]. 
Likewise, the Canadian Standards Association notified 
New Hampshire authorities about a hacking incident 
where an unauthorised intruder accessed encrypted credit 
card details and may also have accessed the encryption 
key [37]. Finally, the Rochester Institute of Technology 
notified state authorities in Maine following the theft of a 
laptop that housed encrypted personal information along 
with the encryption key [38]. These examples challenge 
the assumption of encryption exemptions that encryption 
is inherently effective. 
The TJX data breach demonstrates that encryption 
related concerns also arise in a different guise, namely 
that encryption protocols can be vulnerable to attacks that 
render the protection ineffective. The TJX Corporation is 
the parent company of some of the largest retailers in the 
US. In 2007, identity theft criminals penetrated TJX’s 
systems and retrieved without authorisation the details of 
approximately 94 million credit cards [39, p. 34]. TJX 
failed to comply with the Payment Card Industry (PCI) 
data security standards, illustrated by the collection of an 
unnecessary amount of personal information that was 
unencrypted. Moreover, the unauthorised intrusion was 
made possible because TJX used a wireless network that 
was not sufficiently protected. The wireless network was 
encrypted with the wired equivalent privacy (WEP) 
security protocol that was known to be ineffective. A 
team of sophisticated identity theft criminals was able 
exploit well-known flaws in the WEP encryption to 
access the wireless network. From there they gained entry 
to TJX’s corporate headquarters and were able to retrieve 
credit card and other personal information by using the 
password and username details of authorised users which 
were not adequately protected [39, p. 34]. It is believed 
the intruders had access to TJX’s database systems for 18 
months before they were detected [40]. 
The ramifications of the TJX incident have been 
enormous. A number of banks, credit card providers and 
US states brought legal actions against TJX for losses 
suffered from the data breach. TJX opted to settle legal 
actions brought against them, and for instance, paid Visa 
$US40.9 million compensation [41]. Furthermore, the 
head of the criminal syndicate involved in the TJX data 
breach, Albert Gonzalez, was prosecuted for the data 
breach and pleaded guilty to a number of computer crime 
offences involving TJX and other data breaches [42]. 
Finally, the total estimated cost of the breach is projected 
at $US4.5 billion [39, p. 34]. 
4.2 Analysis of the Underlying Assumption 
The data breaches highlighted above show that the 
simple technical act of encryption does not always 
provide effective information protection. Yet this is the 
underlying assumption of encryption exemptions in US 
state-based data breach notification laws. Encryption is 
not a secure ‘be and end all’ solution to the complex 
issues that arise from the collection and storage of 
personal information [43]. Instead, as indicated in our 
diagram above, effective encryption management should 
be viewed as a continuing process of information security 
assessment that goes beyond the simple act of encrypting 
certain pieces of personal information [3, 44-45]. The 
Second Life data breach demonstrates that organisations 
need to identify and protect all types of personal 
information rather than those datum, such as credit card 
details, that give rise to obvious issues of sensitivity. It 
could be argued that access to a combination of real and 
Second Life identities could be as sensitive for some users 
as the unauthorised acquisition of their credit card details. 
Organisations therefore need to think carefully about what 
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information should be encrypted even though US state-
based data breach notification laws do not adequately 
address this point [2, p. 12].  
It could be argued in the Second Life example that 
laws based solely on the Californian law would have 
operated successfully in this situation because notification 
would have been required for personal information that 
was unencrypted even though some sensitive information 
was encrypted. As such, the broad-brush aspects of the 
Californian law could provide some advantages through 
the flexibility of its expansive approach. However, laws 
based on the Californian law may not provide adequate 
protections regarding the second type of concern 
highlighted. In those situations, personal information was 
encrypted but organisations nonetheless notified due to 
concerns relating to unauthorised access to the decryption 
key or the compromise of usernames and passwords that 
effectively allowed the encryption to be bypassed. The 
broad approach of the Californian law would not have 
required those organisations to notify because all personal 
information was encrypted. However, it is clear that if the 
decryption key had been accessed, as the organisations 
themselves believed, then data could be decrypted thus 
making the encryption exemption redundant. This point is 
recognised by guidance in relation to the Californian law 
[46] but these guidelines have no regulatory authority so 
organisations are not legally obliged to implement 
adequate security measures regarding encryption keys. 
Other state laws that attempt to define encryption 
might not provide any greater protection. For example, 
those laws that focus primarily on the operation of 
encryption, either in the guise of data that is rendered 
unreadable or unusable or where there is a low probability 
of risk of assigning meaning, such as Utah and 
Pennsylvania respectively, would fair no better in this 
situation. Even those laws that attempt to define 
encryption are predicated on the notion that encryption is 
a solitary act of encoding prescribed information rather 
than a continuing process of management. The underlying 
assumption prevails, as it does with laws based on the 
Californian law, that if data is encrypted then it is secured. 
The encryption exemptions that would be likely to 
provide the most effective protection, would be those 
such as the North Carolina and Oregon laws, which 
specifically recognise the risks that can arise from the 
unauthorised acquisition of encryption keys. That said, 
however, in the Voxant data breach, the company notified 
the Maine state government authorities about the breach 
even though the law did not require them to do so. One 
can speculate about the reasons for this but it is possible 
that the instigation of data breach notification laws, 
regardless of what encryption exemption is actually in 
operation, has had the effect of enhancing awareness of 
corporate information security issues regarding the 
management of third-party personal information. 
Regarding the TJX example, none of the encryption 
exemptions would apply because the personal information 
acquired was unencrypted. However, if the opposite was 
the case, and data was encrypted, because the perpetrators 
of the data breach gained such pervasive access to TJX’s 
systems, it would have been good practice for TJX to 
assume that the encryption key had been accessed. This 
again suggests that effective encryption should therefore 
be viewed as a continuous management process and 
preserving the integrity of encrypted communication 
systems is as important as ensuring adequate protections 
for encrypted data [2, p. 12]. With that in mind, the 
authors conclude the paper by examining the ALRC’s 
encryption safe harbour in light of the US experience. 
5. The ALRC’s Safe Harbor – Factor-based 
Analysis 
Australia currently does not have a data breach 
notification law but in 2008, the ALRC concluded that 
there was general support for the introduction of a 
mandatory national data breach notification scheme that 
would be overseen by the Federal Privacy Commissioner. 
Accordingly, the ALRC recommended an amendment to 
the Privacy Act to include a new provision requiring data 
breach notification. The notification trigger recommended 
by the ALRC is a ‘real risk of serious harm’ and the 
ALRC indicated that a key consideration was whether the 
specified personal information was ‘encrypted 
adequately’ [11, p. 1692]. The use of an adequacy 
measure avoids the need ‘to specify exactly what type of 
encryption is adequate’ and assessments of adequacy will 
therefore need to be undertaken on a case-by-case basis in 
conjunction with guidance provided by the Privacy 
Commissioner [11, p. 1692]. As such, unlike the US state-
based exemptions, the ALRC has adopted a factor-based 
analysis safe harbour rather than an exemption. At face 
value, the ALRC’s safe harbor adopts a similar statutory 
philosophy as the construction to the Californian law. 
However, the ALRC’s exemption provides a greater 
conceptual depth as to what constitutes encryption.  
The term ‘adequate’ connotes that encryption is not to 
be considered as an inherently effective technical act, 
contrary to the suggestion by the Californian requirement 
of ‘unencrypted personal information’. Adequate 
encryption should be viewed as the result of well-
functioning management processes and sound technical 
procedures that encompass many different facets and 
requirements, going well beyond the simple act of 
encrypting data. A safe harbour is therefore not available 
to breached entities if the encryption is deemed 
inadequate because it can, for example, be decoded easily 
due to a lack of protection for decryption keys [11, p. 
692] or bypassed due to the failure of authentication 
mechanisms. Moreover, because the assessment of 
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adequacy is based on the factors of each individual data 
breach, including the type of personal information 
breached, the nature of the organization and the risk of 
harm arising, the ALRC have tied the operation of the 
safe harbour to the factual circumstances of each data 
breach, as highlighted in our diagram above. 
Accordingly, there is a distinct absence of the 
underlying assumption of US state-based exemptions that 
encrypted information is always secure regardless of the 
circumstances of the data breach. In fact, the opposite is 
the case. The ALRC’s exemption will only apply if an 
organisation can show that the encryption measures 
adopted were adequate and were likely to remain effective 
in light of the specific particulars of an individual breach.  
Furthermore, because the ALRC has not defined 
adequate encryption they have avoided many of the 
definitional problems of US state-based data breach 
notification laws. The authors contend that some of the 
US state-based encryption exemptions are simply over 
complicated which compromises their utility. For 
example, the Minnesota exemption has nine different 
elements, namely, that personal information was (1) not 
secured by encryption (2) or another method of 
technology (3) that makes electronic data unreadable or 
unusable (4) or was secured (5) and the encryption key (6) 
or password (7) or other means necessary for reading or 
using the data (8) was also acquired (9). Element (1) 
clearly refers to the use of encryption to trigger the 
exemption. However, under element (2) it could be 
argued that a password would suffice to meet the criteria 
of ‘another method of technology’, which seems to be 
reinforced by element (6). The upshot is that a password 
protected set of personal information could be accorded 
the same exemption status as an encrypted data set even 
though password protection may not be as secure as 
encryption. The simplicity of the ALRC’s approach 
therefore avoids such problems but it captures the 
conceptual complexity of effective encryption 
management and thus minimises the scope of the overly 
broad assumption that underpins US state-based 
encryption exemptions.  
  
6. Conclusion 
The encryption exemption in US state-based data 
breach laws is designed to achieve a balance between 
three different regulatory aims: to enhance consumer 
protection against identity theft whilst minimising 
notification fatigue; to minimise the notification 
requirements on organisations to only those that involve a 
risk of identity related crimes, and to improve corporate 
security practices. The extent to which different state-
based exemptions achieve these aims is questionable. US 
state-based exemptions are predicated on a questionable 
underlying assumption that encrypted personal 
information is secure regardless of circumstances. 
However, it has been argued and shown through specific 
examples, that to be effective, encryption must be part of 
an overall information security strategy. It should not be 
viewed as a simple one-off act that is inherently effective. 
The ALRC’s proposed factor-based analysis safe harbour 
is a welcome departure from the use of exemptions as it 
straightforwardly acknowledges the conceptual depth 
entailed in effective encryption management that is sadly 
absent in most US state-based breach notification laws. 
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